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Back to the Future with Chapter 13:
A Response to Professor Scarberry
Adam J. Levitin*
Professor Mark Scarberry has put forth a formidable critique of my
empirical study of mortgage market sensitivity to bankruptcy modification
risk. As this response shows, however, his critique does not hold up under
scrutiny.
Professor Scarberry argues that my study design is invalid because, as
he reads the current state of the law, cramdown is virtually impossible.
Therefore, he contends, we should not expect markets to exhibit sensitivity to
cramdown risk, so no policy conclusions can be derived from my finding of
market insensitivity.
Regrettably, Professor Scarberry overreads the state of the law. The
law is in fact unsettled, and that is all that is necessary to uphold the validity
of my study's design because the market can be expected to price for
uncertainty about the law, and the absence ofsuch a premium is significant.
This response article also challenges Professor Scarberry's contention
that Chapter 13 relief should be limited lest it engender "resentment" of
debtors. The article questions whether prevention of resentment even
provides a sound basis for limiting bankruptcy relief much less when relief
would further an important macroeconomic goal of housing market
stabilization.
More broadly, the article takes issues with claims about the sanctity of
secured credit. Debates about the efficiency of secured credit have all
played out in the business context. In the consumer context, however, the
inefficiency is manifest. Treating secured credit as inviolable would take us
back to the unhappy future of Chapter 7II with higher costs for unsecured
credit and the abusive consumer finance world of Williams v. Walker-
Thomas.
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INTRODUCTION
Professor Mark S. Scarberry's recent article, A Critique of
Congressional Proposals to Permit Modification of Home Mortgages in
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy,' takes sharp issue with my argument that permitting
judicial modification of mortgages in bankruptcy would be an important step
in resolving the foreclosure crisis and likely have little or no impact on the
cost of mortgage credit or mortgage credit availability. My argument about
judicial modification of mortgages was developed in several forms:
Congressional testimony,2 a short online article, and, in its most fully
developed form, in a full-length print article, Resolving the Foreclosure
Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy.4  Reference herein is to
the print article.
At the core of Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis are a set of three natural
experiments on market pricing that exploited variation in legal treatment of
different types of mortgages to examine market price sensitivity to legal
rules.5 The article is premised on the existence of a variation in legal
treatment of different types of mortgages in bankruptcy-it is possible to
1. 37 PEPP. L. REV. 635 (2010).
2. The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis: Is It Time to Reconsider Bankruptcy Reform?: Hearing
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 11Ith Cong.
(2009) (statement of Professor Adam J. Levitin); Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy
Act of 2009, and the Emergency Homeownership and Equity Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 200
and H.R. 225 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Illth Cong. 35-37 (2009) (statement of
Professor Adam J. Levitin); Helping Families Save Their Homes: The Role of Bankruptcy Law:
Hearing on the Bankruptcy Act, S.61 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement
of Professor Adam J. Levitin).
3. Adam J. Levitin, Helping Homeowners: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 3. HARV.
L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (2009), http://www.hipronline.com/LevitinHLPR_01 1909.pdf.
4. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in
Bankruptcy, 2009 Wisc. L. REv. 565 (2009).
5. Id.
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modify mortgages on multifamily homes, second homes, and vacation
homes, but not mortgages secured solely by single-family principal
residences. In spite of this difference in legal treatment, I find that pricing in
the secondary mortgage market and private mortgage insurance market does
not reflect a risk premium, while there is a small one for high-risk borrowers
in the primary market.
I explain this apparent market indifference to variations in bankruptcy
modification risk by showing that lenders typically lose more in a
foreclosure than if a mortgage is modified in bankruptcy. Therefore, I argue,
there would be no reason for the market to price adversely to the ability to
modify a mortgage in bankruptcy. Accordingly, I contend, permitting
modification of all mortgages in Chapter 13 should not be expected to result
in more than a de minimis increase in the cost of credit or decline in credit
availability.
Professor Scarberry contends that my study relies "on incorrect
understandings of current and past bankruptcy law and of the proposed
legislation." 6  In particular, he argues that under existing law, there is
functionally no ability to cramdown any property in bankruptcy. Therefore,
Professor Scarberry claims, there is no real variation in legal treatment, and
we should not expect any market pricing variations, which means that my
experiments do not provide evidence of market indifference to bankruptcy
modification risk. Thus, Professor Scarberry observes that for my
experiments to validly predict the impact of permitting judicial modification
of single-family principal residence mortgages, two conditions must be met:
(1) the kind of Chapter 13 strip down permitted under the proposed
legislation must be the same kind as the kind currently available, or
at least very similar to the kind currently available, and (2) the
likelihood of such a Chapter 13 strip down actually being
accomplished under current law must be the same, or at least very
similar, to the likelihood of strip down being accomplished under
the proposed legislation. Unless both those conditions can be
established, we cannot say that the risk imposed on lenders will be
the same, and we thus cannot say that their response in terms of
1263
6. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 644. I will not address Professor Scarberry's claims that I
misunderstand the proposed legislation beyond stating that I consulted in its drafting and believe that
my understanding of the legislation speaks for itself.
higher interest rates or reduced mortgage availability will be the
same.7
In Professor Scarberry's analysis, these two conditions largely merge;
he contends that stripdown is almost never feasible given the current
constraints on stripdown for multifamily homes, second homes, and vacation
homes.8 From this Professor Scarberry concludes that the status quo is
preferable to a situation in which mortgage modification were more
generally available in Chapter 13.9
This would be a powerful critique, if correct. It is not, however.
Professor Scarberry is wrong on the law, wrong on the economics, and
wrong on the policy animating bankruptcy. The current state of the law does
not contain the constraints on cramdown alleged by Professor Scarberry.
Instead, the law is unsettled, and for my study to be valid, all that is needed
is uncertainty about the law because the market can be expected to price for
uncertainty about the law and the chance that mortgages can in fact be
modified. Therefore, the absence of an observable risk premium is
significant. Perhaps more critically, market behavior shows that the market
believes that there are variations in modification risk, and ultimately it is
what the market, not Professor Scarberry, believes about the law that
matters.
This response is organized as follows. Part I shows that the differences
between existing and proposed Chapter 13 modification are quite minimal.'o
The major difference alleged by Professor Scarberry-whether a modified
mortgage must be paid off in full within five years-is an unsettled matter of
law. There is no textual support for Professor Scarberry's position in the
Bankruptcy Code; there is no policy basis for his position; the scant case law
is not unanimous on the issue and should hardly be taken as an indication of
bankruptcy practice; and the secondary sources cited by Professor Scarberry
(including one authored by me) do not say what he believes they mean.
Part II explains that even if Professor Scarberry were correct about the
state of the law, that does not provide evidence of market sensitivity to
bankruptcy modification of mortgages, and there is strong reason to believe
that it would not be price sensitive." It also explains that even if markets are
price sensitive to bankruptcy modification, this alone is not a reason to
oppose modification.12
7. Id. at 721-22.
8. See id. at 721-25.
9. Underlying Professor Scarberry's reasoning is an unstated argument in favor of the status
quo in the absence of evidence. It is unclear why in such circumstances the status quo should be
preferable.
10. See infra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
1264
[Vol. 37: 1261, 2010] Back to the Future with Chapter 13
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Part III examines Professor Scarberry's concern that permitting Chapter
13 mortgage modification would result in harmful resentment of debtors. It
questions whether protecting debtors from intangible resentment is a sound
basis for denying them real monetary relief, and whether resentment is ever
a sound basis for policy, much less a reason that would trump pressing
macroeconomic concerns.
The response concludes by evaluating the implications of opposing
mortgage modification in bankruptcy, which takes us to a world in which
secured credit is sacrosanct.' 3 Treating secured credit as inviolable would
take us back to the unhappy future of Chapter XIII (referred to now as
"Roman 13"), higher costs for unsecured credit, and the abusive consumer
finance world of Williams v. Walker-Thomas.
I. PROFESSOR SCARBERRY'S DOCTRINAL READING IS WRONG
Professor Scarberry claims that under current bankruptcy law it is
impossible to modify not only a mortgage loan on a single-family principal
residence, but also mortgages on any other type of residential property,
except in rare cases. The basis for Professor Scarberry's claim is that a
Chapter 13 "plan may not provide for payments over a period that is longer
than 5 years."' 4 As Professor Scarberry notes:
Does a debtor belong in bankruptcy who is so flush with cash that
he or she can afford to pay off the entire value of his or her home
with interest over a mere five years? A Chapter 13 plan, under
which the debtor would do so, would be proposed in bad faith, and
thus not confirmable, at least unless it also provided for full
payment of all unsecured claims.' 5
Therefore, in Professor Scarberry's view, almost no mortgages can
functionally be modified in bankruptcy because almost no debtor can pay off
a mortgage within five years without running afoul of other Bankruptcy
Code provisions.' 6
13. See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).
15. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 665 (footnote omitted).
16. To emphasize this point, Professor Scarberry observes that "the quotes Professor Levitin
obtained for his study were for quite substantial mortgages." Scarberry, supra note 1, at 723. The
implication is that for smaller mortgages-which could be paid off within five years-my findings
do not hold. This is incorrect. Professor Scarberry mistakes the thirty quotations given in an
illustrative appendix as evidence of the extent of my research. My study had a sample of 530
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Professor Scarberry is wrong regarding the state of the law. Rather than
clearly supporting his position, it is unsettled. A plain reading of the
relevant statutory text plus a rational understanding of policy embodied in
the text indicates that a modified mortgage need not be paid in full within
five years. Instead, the mortgagee must merely receive the net present value
of the mortgage, which could take the form of a new secured note.
A. A Plain Reading of the Bankruptcy Code Indicates a Broad Ability to
Modify Most Mortgages
There are several problems with Professor Scarberry's claim about the
status of the law. First, the law is simply not clear on whether a mortgage
debt must be paid off in full by the end of the Chapter 13 plan. While the
Bankruptcy Code requires that payments under a plan be made within no
more than five years, the Code does not say what it means by "payments."
The term payment does not necessarily mean cash payments, as Professor
Scarberry assumes.
Other provisions in Chapter 13 show that the term "payments" is clearly
not limited to cash payments." First, Chapter 13 explicitly calls for cash
payments in the context of payments made on claims entitled to priority
under section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code: "The plan shall ... (2) provide
for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to
priority under section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a particular claim
agrees to a different treatment of such claim."" The explicit reference to
"full payment" as well as to "deferred cash payments" contrasts with the
Code's requirement for repayment of allowed secured claims, such as home
mortgages, for which the mortgagee must receive "the value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim."l 9
This distinction was noted by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in Till v.
SCS Credit Corporation: "nothing in § 1325 suggests that 'property' is
quotations, half of which were for less than the conforming loan amount. Levitin, supra note 4, at
587. I did not report the loan amounts for all price quotations, but they went as low as $100,000-
less than half the national average-and showed no change. The particular illustration given
included a loan for $320,000 in California, which is less than the average California mortgage
amount of $331,926. Mortgage Bankers Association, Stop the Cramdown Resource Center,
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/StopTheCramDown (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). The phenomenon
of pricing indifference in the primary market does not depend on loan size.
In fairness, Professor Scarberry does note the possibility that a mortgage could simply be
refinanced within the term of the plan. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 666 n. 131.
17. Since October 2005, the Bankruptcy Code has contained additional language that further
constraints Chapter 13 plans, but the new language does not change the meaning of the terms
"payments" or "value."
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (emphasis added).
19. 11 USC. § 1325(a)(5)(b)(ii).
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limited to cash. Rather, 'property' can be cash, notes, stock, personal
property or real property; in short, anything of value." 20
Accordingly, from a plain language reading of the text, there is no
requirement that secured claims receive "full payment" during the course of
the plan or that the payments be made in cash. Rather, the secured lender is
entitled to the "value" of its claim, as of the effective date of the plan. If the
property can be "crammed down," then the "value" of the claim is the value
of the collateral. This value could be in the form of a new mortgage note, so
long as it provided for equivalent net present value to the lender. Section
1325(a)(5)(b)(ii) is a net present value test for a Chapter 13 plan payment-
precisely what Professor Scarberry believes to be essential for Chapter 13 to
be fair to creditors.21
B. Professor Scarberry's Textual Reading Would Result in a Policy
Absurdity
My reading of the text comports with a reasonable policy directive: that
Congress wanted to favor single-family principal residence mortgages in
order to encourage single-family homeownership but did not want to
encourage multifamily, rental, or vacation homeownership. To accept
Professor Scarberry's reading of current doctrine-that payment in full for a
modified mortgage must be made within the term of the plan-we would
have to assume a nearly absurd policy directive from Congress: that
Congress, in its infinite wisdom, wanted to forbid all mortgage
modifications except modifications of mortgages of multifamily residences,
vacation homes, and rental properties, if the modified mortgage could be
paid off within three to five years. There is absolutely nothing in the
legislative history that supports the belief that Congress wanted this peculiar
outcome, and there is no compelling policy reason for it. Yet this is the
absurdity that Professor Scarberry's reading would force on the text.
C. Caselaw and Secondary Sources Are Inconclusive
Professor Scarberry marshals a number of sources to support his reading
of the law. First, he turns to caselaw.22 He relies heavily on the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank23 and dicta in the
20. 541 U.S. 465, 488 (2004).
21. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 636-48.
22. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 661-67.
23. In re Enewally, 368 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Second Circuit's ruling in Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation.2 4 He also cites for support a passing line in an academic
article25 and a sentence in a report by the Congressional Oversight Panel
supervising the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).26
Neither the primary nor secondary sources cited by Professor Scarberry
are anywhere close to dispositive. At best, what can be said is that the law is
unclear on the issue. That uncertainty is all that is necessary for my
experiments to be valid, because the market can be expected to price for the
downside risk in an uncertain outcome.
There are three problems with reliance on Enewally and Bellamy. First,
there is countervailing law.27 In re McGregor, a bankruptcy court decision
from 1994, suggested that a debtor might amend a plan to provide for
payments on stripped-down principal at the original contract interest rate in
the amount called for by the mortgage contract until the total principal
payments equaled the allowed amount of the secured claim. 28 Admittedly, it
is only a single bankruptcy court's opinion, but it is still good law; a ruling
by a single appellate panel is hardly a definitive and final expression of the
state of the law.
Second, Enewally was decided too late to affect all of my experiments.
Enewally was decided in 2004. The data for one of my three experiments is
from 1989-1993, so Enewally is irrelevant to its outcome. I do not have pre-
Enewally data from my other experiments, but there is no reason to think
that mortgage insurance or GSE delivery fee pricing changed in response to
Enewally. There are some other earlier lower court opinions that align with
Enewally, but all they do is point to the uncertainty of the issue.
Just as Enewally is too recent to affect all of my experiments, Bellamy is
too old and not on point. Bellamy is a pre-Nobelman decision and its three
sentences regarding whether a modified loan must be paid off in five years
are dicta; the debtors were not attempting to pay a modified loan off over
more than five years, but to strip the lien to the value of the collateral.29
Third, reported case law may be a poor guide to actual Chapter 13
practice. Most of bankruptcy law exists outside of reported case law,
especially in the Chapter 13 context. Judges will frequently rule orally from
the bench, and most issues are resolved consensually, if they are contested at
24. In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176. (2d Cir. 1992).
25. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 707 (citing John Eggum, Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey,
Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
1123).
26. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 669 (citing CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, FORECLOSURE
CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION 54 (2009) [hereinafter WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION],
http://cop.senate.gov/ documents/cop-030609-report.pdf).
27. See Levitin, supra note 4, at 580 n.40.
28. 172 B.R. 718, 721 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
29. 962 F.2d at 177.
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all. Relative to other areas of law, Chapter 13 is the Wild West; much is
done informally and is negotiated. Bankruptcy courts are courts of the deal,
and we assume legal practice from a handful of reported cases or dicta at our
peril. Opinions like Enewally are merely starting points for the negotiations
that are the heart of bankruptcy.
The secondary sources relied upon by Professor Scarberry are also thin
support for his position.30 A passing reference in an academic article cannot
be taken as a considered opinion on the state of the law on this issue.
Likewise, a single sentence in a 198-page monthly government report
provides scant support.
Professor Scarberry attempts to disguise the weakness of these sources
by appealing to the prestige of the authors," but that does not affect the
quality of the sources as support.32 Moreover, as Special Counsel to the
Congressional Oversight Panel, I was the drafter of the report in question.
The cited line does not bear the meaning dragooned onto it by Professor
Scarberry. It says what it means and means what it says-that payments
under a plan must be made in five years. It does not address what is meant
by a "payment." Reading it as "full cash payment" is Professor Scarberry's
gloss.
D. The Market Believes There Is a Broad Ability to Modify Mortgages in
Chapter 13
Professor Scarberry overreads the present state of the law. But whether
my reading or Professor Scarberry's reading of the existing law is correct is
ultimately irrelevant. What matters is what the market believes. And the
evidence indicates that the market at least believes the law to be unsettled.
30. Among Professor Scarberry's primary authorities is himself. Thus, when Professor
Scarberry states, "Even though serious flaws in his empirical studies have been pointed out,
Professor Levitin continues to claim in congressional testimony that 'the clear finding from [his]
research is that mortgage prices are largely insensitive to bankruptcy modification risk."' Scarberry,
supra note 1, at 643-644 (footnote omitted). The "serious flaws" are merely the claims of Professor
Scarberry. My failure to agree with Professor Scarberry cannot possibly determine the merits of my
argument.
31. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 669 (gratuitously invoking that the Congressional Oversight Panel
is chaired by Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Warren); id at 716 (same); id. (referring to "the
authors of a recent and impressive empirical study, including Professor Katherine Porter," the
second, but perhaps academically best known, of three co-authors).
32. I caution readers in general not to assume that Congressional Oversight Panel reports reflect
the views of any particular Panelist, including the Chairperson. Reports are produced under
significant time constraints on a consensus basis, and the Panel does not issue legal opinions.
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The mortgage market itself evinces an awareness of variation in
modification risk. Many securitization deals provide for a separate loss-
sharing mechanism for losses above a minimum threshold caused by
bankruptcy modification as opposed to losses caused by normal defaults.33
There is no reason for such a distinct mechanism if there is no meaningful
risk of modification.
Likewise, if Professor Scarberry is correct, why are debtors bringing
cases that seek to modify mortgages on multifamily properties? What good
would this do them? Are they simply misguided? If so, why are creditors
fighting them over the right to modify if it is a meaningless right?
Whether Chapter 13 requires that a modified mortgage be paid off
within five years is an open question, not open-and-shut as Professor
Scarberry alleges.34 Responsible counsel would not advise a lender that
there is no risk of judicial modification in Chapter 13 regardless of type of
property. And that is all that is necessary to uphold the validity of my
empirical study, as we can expect the market to price for risk when there is
uncertainty due to unsettled law. As the following section explains, the fact
that such a premium is not observable is a function of the relationship
between foreclosure risk and modification risk.
II. PROFESSOR SCARBERRY'S CRITIQUE MISSES THE BIGGER POINT
Even if Professor Scarberry is right about the state of the law, his
argument only goes to the design of my natural experiments. It does not
say anything about the ultimate question of whether permitting bankruptcy
modification of single-family principal residence mortgages would result in
higher costs and lower availability of credit.
Even if my natural experiments could not support a finding of market
indifference to bankruptcy modification risk, it would not follow that
markets are sensitive to the risk, only that indifference has not been proven.
Professor Scarberry proclaims a credo of: bankruptcy losses = higher costs
of credit = less credit availability, as if it were self-evident:
Interest rates and mortgage availability are sensitive to expected
losses. Expected losses from strip down would seem undoubtedly
33. Levitin, supra note 4, at 649 n.302; see also, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Chase
Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2007-Al, Feb. 1, 2007, Article I (providing for special distribution
of bankruptcy losses among tranches).
34. See also Posting of Robert Lawless to Credit Slips: A Discussion on Credit and Bankruptcy,
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2007/12/equal-footings.html#more (Dec. 17, 2007 12:21 PM)
(arguing that modified mortgage can be paid off in over five years).
35. 1 use the term "natural experiment" to refer to any situation in which real world events create
the opportunity for comparing two groups. The term is sometimes reserved for situations in which
there is a mechanism for randomly assigning units to conditions.
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to be higher where strip down is used by debtors who cannot afford
to pay their current contractual monthly mortgage payments as
compared to those who can afford to make that payment and more,
or even afford to pay off the entire mortgage in five years. This
additional flaw makes it even less likely that Professor Levitin's
empirical studies could provide reliable evidence that enactment of
the proposed legislation would have little effect on mortgage
interest rates and mortgage availability.36
In fact, Professor Scarberry has the economics of lending backwards.
The expected losses would be smaller if stripdown were available not only
to those who can already afford to pay their mortgages (or pay them off
within five years), but to those who cannot afford to pay. If a debtor can
afford to pay the mortgage, then from a creditor's perspective, stripdown is
pure loss.
Professor Scarberry is so focused on bankruptcy doctrine that he fails to
recognize that bankruptcy is a not a universe unto itself. Bankruptcy
outcomes must always be compared with nonbankruptcy outcomes. In this
case, the appropriate baseline for evaluating bankruptcy is foreclosure. If a
debtor cannot afford to pay the mortgage, then a foreclosure will result.
Therefore, we must compare the losses a lender will incur in foreclosure
with those the lender would incur with a bankruptcy modification. The
lender will undoubtedly incur a loss in bankruptcy, but as long as that is
smaller than that which would attain in foreclosure, the magnitude of the
bankruptcy loss is irrelevant; the lender will not price against the ability to
modify in bankruptcy. My article provides a fair amount of empirical
support for this; more recent empirical work by Professor Alan White
confirms it.37 This is the major argument of my article; the empirical work
merely provides support for it, yet Professor Scarberry focuses on the
empirics and misses the bigger point.
Incredibly, for someone who has just engaged in an exacting critique of
empirical research, Professor Scarberry feels free to engage in a wild reverie
of speculation. If judicial modification were allowed, he prophesizes that
"the typical borrower would be forced to pay at least a half percent and
perhaps a full one percent higher mortgage interest rate, and the higher risk
36. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 724.
37. See Alan M. White, November 26, 2009 Columbia Collateral File Summary Statistics,
http://www.valpo.edu/law/faculty/awhite/data/nov09_sulmary.pdf (finding an average loss on
foreclosure of $143,987-$151,000, equivalent to 64-65% loss severity, as compared with 6-10%
loss severity in modification).
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borrower would pay an interest rate two or three percent higher than the
rates that otherwise would be charged."38
To put the extravagance of his predictions in perspective, the average
rate on the 30-year fixed rate mortgage for the past 20 years has been 7.36%,
a mere 166 basis points above the average 10-year Treasury bond yield.
Thus, the entire risk premium, on average, for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage
for the past two decades is but 166 basis points, yet Professor Scarberry is
positing an average impact of 50-100 basis points, and 200-300 for high
risk borrowers. Even if bankruptcy did result in greater losses than
foreclosure, it is a much rarer event and would likely remain so even if
mortgage modification were permitted in Chapter 13, as Chapter 13 still
requires plan feasibility. Most financially distressed homeowners do not file
for bankruptcy; the belief that permitting Chapter 13 modification of
mortgages would result in an increase in mortgage interest rates of 50-100
basis points on average is simply ludicrous. Professor Scarberry's
predictions are not in the realm of possibility.
Still, it's worth playing out the scenario that animates Professor
Scarberry's thinking. What if permitting judicial modification of mortgages
would result in a higher cost of credit or less credit availability? Would this
be a bad thing? Professor Scarberry's reflexive answer is yes. I suggest that
the answer is more complicated and depends on the magnitude of the impact
and the distribution of the cost.
Bankruptcy functions like mandatory insurance against financial
distress; the cost is borne by everyone ex-ante in the form of a "premium"
for higher costs of credit, even though only a small number of
"policyholders" ever file a "claim" on the "policy."
Consider Chapter 13 cramdown, which reduces the allowed amount of a
secured claim to the value of the collateral (leaving the rest of the claim as
unsecured). For a mortgage this is just a type of property depreciation
insurance. Property depreciation is an insurable event-it is a fortuitous
occurrence beyond the borrower's control if the national (or local) housing
market slumps. The borrower even pays a "deductible" here in the form of
its lost down payment plus any other previously accrued equity, which
reduces moral hazard. We should only require such mandatory insurance if
it is socially efficient, and that depends on its pricing-the cost/availability
of credit impact. The evidence I have previously adduced points strongly
towards its efficiency, 40 but further research would enhance our
understanding.
38. Scarberry, supra note 1, at 726.
39. Ten-year Treasuries are the typical comparison for 30-year fixed rate mortgages because the
average mortgage is prepaid in 7-10 years.
40. See generally Levitin, supra note 4.
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III. RESENTMENT AS A BASIS FOR POLICY?
Professor Scarberry never takes a firm normative position on Chapter 13
mortgage modification in his article. He suggests ways that modification
legislation might be made more palatable, 4 ' but that is hardly an
endorsement of the modification concept, and the changes he would have
make would geld Chapter 13 as a mortgage modification tool, allowing only
"modest modifications in limited circumstances."42 At best, this is a
grudging, nominal endorsement of Chapter 13 modification. Such a
watered-down form of Chapter 13 modification would be ineffective at
addressing the collapse of the housing market.
Professor Scarberry argues that these limitations are necessary to
address "moral hazard, self-cure risk, redefault risk, and creation of
resentment."43 Plan feasibility requirements44 already cover redefault risk.
The other elements basically boil down to resentment of the granting of debt
relief debtors who can afford their mortgage or who stand to gain a free
option on future appreciation of their property.45
Professor Scarberry's emphasis on resentment is puzzling.46 Chapter 13
is hardly a "drive-by" process,47 and no evidence has ever been adduced of a
systematic problem of debtors gaming the bankruptcy system to get
unmerited relief. How many people would really resent their neighbors for
having to live for five years on a strict, court-supervised budget? How many
people would agree to live on such a budget (and have their credit score
damaged for ten years) simply to have the chance that they might capture
some potential appreciation on their property? I think very few indeed.
What is this resentment then? Is it a resentment of profligate individuals
who bought more home than they really could afford getting able to keep
their McMansions? Is it a resentment of potentially higher future mortgage
41. Scarberry, supra note 1, at [283-291-basically the conclusion section of Scarberry's article]
42. Id., at [291-this should be the last or second to last page of his article].
43. Id. at 285 [this is in the Conclusion].
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).
45. This concern is largely theoretical. There is little likelihood of substantial future appreciation
over the next five years; certainly housing price futures do not anticipate it. The Worsening
Foreclosure Crisis: Is It Time to Reconsider Bankruptcy Reform?, Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Illth
Cong., July 23, 2009 (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin), at 6, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdfl07-22-09LevitinTestimony.pdf. Moreover, any appreciation after the
term of a plan would always be the debtor's.
46. Professor Scarberry uses the term "resentment" repeatedly. Scarberry, supra note 1, at [give
page cites for the 9 times Scarberry mentions resentment]
47. Id. at I1.
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prices because of mandatory bankruptcy "insurance"? Why would this
engender more resentment than using federal tax dollars to subsidize the
ineffective HAMP modifications Professor Scarberry supports?
No one likes the thought of profligate parvenus using Chapter 13 to
retain ownership of houses that are out of the reach of hardworking yeomen
who live within their means. But should minimization of the resentment that
would engender really be the basis for federal bankruptcy policy? Protecting
debtors from generalized, intangible resentment is not a compelling reason
for limiting their relief from real monetary obligations. Chapter 13
mortgage modification can contribute substantially to housing market
stabilization, and, as my research indicates, it comes at little or no cost to
future borrowers. Surely pressing macroeconomic concerns, like stabilizing
the housing market trump any neighborly resentments.
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH CHAPTER 13?
Irrespective of whether Professor Scarberry ultimately supports Chapter
13 mortgage modification in any meaningful sense, it is important to
recognize the implications of opposition to mortgage modification in
bankruptcy. Opposing mortgage modification is tantamount to expressing a
belief in the inviolability of secured credit. Since the 2005 Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), a good deal of
secured credit has been inviolable. BAPCPA made many auto loans
untouchable. 48 Principal residence single-family mortgages are inviolable
too,49 and functionally, Professor Scarberry argues, so are all other
mortgages. Homes and cars account for the bulk of secured credit. Non-
purchase money security interests in consumer goods are illegal,50 and most
major consumer goods are purchased using unsecured credit cards. The only
major exception would be for boats, off-road vehicles," and aircraft. Thus,
in the world as described by Professor Scarberry, secured lenders are safe
unless they are lending against boats, snowmobiles, and aircraft.
This is functionally a return to Chapters XII and XIII (now called
"Roman 12" and "Roman 13," respectively) under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. Chapter XII permitted "arrangements" that would modify non-
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (hanging paragraph).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
50. 12 C.F.R. § 227.13(d) (2009) (all banks except savings banks that are members of the
Federal Home Loan Bank System); 12 C.F.R. § 535.2(a)(4) (2009) (federal thrifts and federally
insured thrifts); 12 C.F.R. §706.2(a)(4) (2009) (federal credit unions and federally insured credit
unions); 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (nonbanks).
51. 49 U.S.C. §30102(a)(6) (2006) ("'[M]otor vehicle' means a vehicle driven or drawn by
mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but
does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.").
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corporate debts secured by real property.52  Most home mortgages were
ineligible for Chapter XII arrangements,53 and for those that were, the
mortgagee nearly always had the power to veto any plan.54 Chapter XIII
permitted wage earners' plans that allowed for modification of unsecured
debt,55 but required the consent of any secured creditor, unless that creditor
was paid 100 cents on the dollar or the collateral was surrendered.56 Thus
under Chapters XII and XIII only unsecured debts could be modified absent
creditor consent. Given the limited value of these provisions, there were few
filings under either Chapter. From 1965-1974, annual Chapter XII filings
averaged 86, and Chapter XIII filings averaged 29,166."
Not surprisingly, given the divergent treatment of secured and
unsecured credit under the Bankruptcy Act, secured credit was far more
common. Creditors were incentivized to lend against collateral. Household
items like washing machines, kitchen furniture, and babies' cribs were all
commonly financed using secured credit, rather than with unsecured credit
cards, like today.
Because of the frequency of secured credit, unsecured credit was more
expensive. If more lenders lend against collateral, then there will be fewer
assets available to satisfy judgments of unsecureds, who have to protect
themselves with a price premium.5t  The more favored the treatment of
secured credit, the higher the cost of unsecured credit.
52. Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 916-30 (1938).
53. Chapter XII excluded from its coverage all mortgages insured by the Federal Housing
Administration, guaranteed by the Veterans' Administration, or held by the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation, Federal Home Loan Banks, or the savings and loans that were members of the Federal
Home Loan Banks. 11 U.S.C. § 517 (1976) (repealed 1978). This effectively made most home
mortgages ineligible for Chapter XII arrangements.
54. An arrangement could only be confirmed, however, if it was approved by the holders of two-
thirds of the affected debt. 11 U.S.C. § 468 (1976) (repealed 1978). For a consumer mortgagor, this
meant an effective veto power over arrangements by first mortgagees (and potentially by junior
mortgagees) because they were likely to hold at least one-third of the mortgage debt.
55. Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 930-38 (1938).
56. Chapter XIII placed no statutory limitations on the ability to modify a secured debt, including
a mortgage, as part of a wage earner's plan. 11 U.S.C. § 646 (1976) (repealed 1978). A wage
earner's plan that affected a secured debt could not be confirmed, however, without the consent of
the affected secured creditor. Id. § 1052(1) (repealed 1978). Therefore, it was impossible under
Chapter XIII to modify a mortgage or any other secured debt without the consent of the impaired
creditor.
57. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 161,
Table 18 (1974).
58. Unsecureds might also have insisted on a price premium because of their more limited
bargaining leverage upon distress and because of informational disadvantages relative to secured
creditors.
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Moreover, while secured credit was cheaper than unsecured credit, it
came with its own cost-abusive lending, as secured consumer lenders lend
for hostage value, rather than resale value on repossessed assets (there isn't
much of a market for used bed sheets or sofas). 9 Secured credit operates via
self-help repossession-the legally-sanctioned private use of force. This is a
system that is easily abused by lenders' agents (most likely big burly guys)
threatening consumers.
Not surprisingly both courts 60 and administrative agencies6' have
recoiled from treating secured credit as inviolable in the consumer context.
There is a long-standing debate about the efficiency of secured credit, but it
has played out almost entirely in the business credit context. In the
consumer context, however, the inefficiency of inviolable secured credit is
manifest.62
Prohibition on the modification of secured debt in Chapter 13-
perilously close to what Professor Scarberry would allow-would take us
back to the world of Williams v. Walker-Thomas.3 Perhaps this is an
advance on what we might call the original "Roman 13"-the practice in
ancient Rome of selling a debtor into slavery or physically dividing the
debtor's body among creditorsM-but it is hardly the way we should want
our consumer finance system to operate. Surely Professor Scarberry doesn't
really want to go back to this future.
59. See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 159 (1997); see also RALPH A. YOUNG & ASSOCIATES, PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES AND
THEIR CREDITPRACTICES 77 (1940), available at http://www.nber.org/books/youn40- 1.
60. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
61. See supra note 43.
62. For a review of the debate see Robert Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 1436, 1437 n.] (1997).
63. Williams, 350 F.2d 445.
64. See Donald E. Phillipson, Development ofthe Roman Law ofDebt Security, 20 STAN. L.
REv. 1230, 1232-33 (1968); see also LEX DUODECIM TABULARUM, Tabula III ("tertiis autem
nundinis capite poenas dabant, aut trans Tiberim peregre venum ibant. tertiis nundinis partis
secanto. si plus minusve secuerunt, se fraude esto.") (prescribing that if a debtor does not pay ajudgment for sixty days, the debtor is to be held in bondage and brought before the court in the
forum on three successive market days and the amount of the debt publicly announced. Then, "On
the third market day, [the debtor] shall suffer capital punishment or be sold [into slavery] across the
River Tiber. On the third market day [if there are multiple creditors] they may cut [the debtor to]
pieces.").
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